

## BOOK REVIEW

Sachin Chaturvedi, Thomas Fues, and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (eds.), *Development Cooperation and Emerging Powers: New Partners or Old Patterns?* (New York and London: Zed Books, 2012), Pages: 288, Price: \$35.95, £19.99.

There is already very considerable literature on different facets of South-South cooperation but the volume under review delves into a newer trajectory and is intended to address the recent and growing phenomenon of development cooperation activities by the so-called emerging powers. The question they try to answer is whether such emerging powers are “new partners” or whether they will follow “old patterns” of the traditional advanced-country donors.

Contrary to what the title suggests, the focus in this volume is not on development cooperation in its different manifestations but essentially on the extension of “aid” in different forms. (In Chapter 2 Manmohan Agarwal does, however, address the broader dimensions.) The country-specific contributions of emerging powers cover Brazil, China, India, South Africa and, surprisingly, Mexico, an OECD member country. This selection is perhaps based on the G-5 concept that had for some time emerged in discussions with the G-8 but was soon thereafter subsumed by the G-20. By any definition, emerging powers is a group that is broader than the one on whom the individual studies are included in this volume.

There is also lack of clarity between what are “emerging powers” and “advanced countries and rising powers of the South”. The presumption is that both groups are essentially the same. This may not necessarily be the case in real terms. Creation of newer categories among developing countries also does not help the debate in general, besides being divisive of developing countries.

No real effort has been made to explain why this volume focuses only on the so-called emerging powers and does not address the broader and more important issue of South-South cooperation in its different manifestations. The latter is particularly relevant in the context of the ongoing global financial and economic crisis. In that sense, this volume’s scope is seriously limited. The motivation appears essentially to be to suggest that these emerging powers and the traditional developed aid-giving countries need to coordinate policy in aid matters so as to establish a new global framework. This would need to

take into account the growing relevance of these new powers to the relatively more recent and ongoing changes in international economic power balances. This latter conclusion is inescapable and is already being addressed by policymakers in both traditional aid donors and developing-country development cooperation providers. The difficulty in finding a consensus on how to proceed on this is clear in the lack of forward movement in the Seoul Development Agenda adopted by the G-20.

In that context, the conclusion drawn by the authors on a new international framework for development cooperation on page 255 is pertinent. They say: “in considering the potential for enhanced coordination the international community needs to face up to the growing relevance of *South-South cooperation* and to take into consideration the shifting environment of a highly integrated and networked world.”

Part Three of the volume contains studies on the assistance provided by Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa. The sections on Brazil and Mexico are useful but largely descriptive. That on India touches broadly on several of India’s varied development cooperation activities but the gaps in information, perhaps for no fault of the author, are many. The chapter on China adds little to what is already in the public domain. That on South Africa, however, is particularly useful and frank. It also touches on the important issues that arise in the effort to make new development cooperation providers adopt international criteria in their development cooperation activities. The author, Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, is blunt in her concluding assessment that “development diplomacy may therefore prove a critical element if South Africa wants to play a significant role on the broader global political stage, well beyond the boundaries of its immediate neighbourhood.”

The authors do not come to any conclusion on whether or not NAM and G-77 will act in support of nudging emerging powers into a more conciliatory attitude towards traditional donors or whether they will instead press Southern providers to deepen the North-South divide and to create a separate universe of South-South cooperation. They believe, and rightly so, that further analytical work is needed to identify the key characteristics of the new development paradigm in a multipolar world no longer dominated by Western values, perceptions and interests.

Notwithstanding its limitations and some sweeping statements made (for example, Lines 5–9 on page 243) this volume is worth a read for those interested in better understanding the efforts being made by traditional aid donors to make the new development cooperation providers from the South (the so-

called emerging powers) conform to norms and practices developed and adopted by the former and which are intended to meet the stated and unstated political, economic and strategic objectives and requirements of the developed countries.

NALIN SURIE

Former Ambassador of India to Poland and to China  
Former High Commissioner of India to the UK  
and Former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs

★ ★ ★

Kevin McGrath, *Confronting Al-Qaeda: New Strategies to Combat Terrorism* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011), Pages: 336, Price: \$42.95.

Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2011), Pages: 210, Price: \$14.95.

Amidst a sense of triumph after the raid on Osama bin Laden in May 2011, the United States was left with a binary choice: either dump Pakistan out of sheer wariness or continue the despairing engagement till Afghanistan is made stable. Osama was apprehended and killed in the military town of Abbotabad, in the heart of the territory of Pakistan, the United States' crucial ally in the war on terror. He was reportedly staying there since 2005. In terms of the war on terror, the raid on Osama was a defining moment. Putting an end to the al-Qaeda chief, who somehow managed to dodge the American forces for over a decade, was the psychological edge the US had long been seeking for.

The two books under review – both published before the Osama killing – showcase seminal work on pivotal issues revolving round the war on terror – the relationship between the United States and Pakistan and the strategy to tackle and eliminate the al-Qaeda network and its affiliates.

In *Confronting Al Qaeda*, the author describes how al-Qaeda's adaptability to changing times and different international environments has contributed to its sustainability and strength. The book captures the group's evolution after the events of 11 September 2001 (9/11), when its identity became known universally. Tracing the roots of the conflict, he analyses how the US and al-Qaeda have been pitted against each other over the years and studies the broader political dimensions of their mutual antagonism. In the context of this struggle, he surveys US policies with respect to Iraq, Iran and Pakistan before concentrating on Afghanistan.

The author states that al-Qaeda's fluidity gives it an advantage vis-à-vis the US (p. 25). The United States' options in its struggle against extremism are restricted and shrinking further, as the US approach has been more or less confined to application of hard power (p. 27). The author, however, makes an interesting point that al-Qaeda has largely failed in its political mission. To elaborate, 9/11 left Americans petrified and they developed a visceral hatred for al-Qaeda. Its political objectives, if there were any, were dwarfed by the

violence that characterized the attack.

The author maintains that the Bush administration's decoupling of political agendas and the inherent economic burdens proved "strategically hobbling" and put the US on the verge of facing a guns-or-butter choice (p. 61). On the other hand, at an approximate cost of \$500,000, 9/11 could be categorized as a low-cost terror attempt; al Qaeda was able to raise this money within the US itself (p. 59). The author also deals with the likely implications of the struggle between al-Qaeda and the US (p. 91).

In Iraq, al-Qaeda under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was able to gain ground as the situation slipped out of US control. Lack of strategy and planning on the United States' part coupled with a failed state structure in Iraq, the author postulates, accounted for this. This was further exacerbated by the Shia dynamics played out with tacit support from the US. After the troop surge in 2007, the US decided on eventual drawdown, leading to the final exit of US troops from Iraq towards the end of 2011.

The protracted and extensive US engagements in this part of the world, which involve multiple commitments simultaneously, have drained the Americans mentally, physically and financially. *Vis-à-vis* al-Qaeda, the source of conflict confronting the US is not monolithic. The threat from terrorism in this region is complex, being a combination of warlords, tribes, al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network and its accomplices in the establishment in Pakistan.

It is the author's view that the conflict with al-Qaeda may at best be managed but the group is hardly likely to be eliminated (p. 250). The US needs to come out of the combative mode and think more in terms of political solutions, extending political incentives to US adversaries. The author advocates engaging the rather moderate factions of these groups (possibly those fatigued with an armed struggle spanning years) and proffering them solutions which are not only political but social and cultural. He also advocates encouraging such factions to participate in the political processes.

The book by the Schaffers deals with the wider spectrum of issues in Pakistan and how this affects its relationship with the United States. It surveys a cross-section of Pakistani society to draw inferences on Pakistan's negotiating behaviour – for instance, how India's equation with Afghanistan has shaped Pakistan's behaviour and impacted its strategic calculus. Pakistan's obsessive India-centric approach has been instrumental in shaping its strategic behaviour and its negotiating pattern with the United States (pp. 143–61). Individual instances proffered by the authors include former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's attempt to justify the Kargil War (1999) within the ambit of the larger

Kashmir cause.

Pakistan's tactics and dynamism have been a function of individual chemistry, the nature of the government and the centre of power and authority. Pakistan is complacent that the US will be totally preoccupied with regional objectives, which will mute its concerns about Pakistan's nuclear programme (p. 46). Pakistan also believes that no one knows Afghanistan better than Pakistan does.

US-Pakistan engagement spans over six decades, with rough patches in between. The relationship has intrinsically been inhibited by disbelief and insecurity. Between the two, Pakistan feels more insecure, being the smaller power. It has the constant tendency to play the victim card and benefits from it.

Alluding to the role of personal links, the authors point out how Pakistan ambassadors in Washington have heavily influenced negotiations between the two countries: even the defence attachés of Brigadier rank play a significant part, depending upon the kind of rapport they forge with the Pentagon (p. 89).

Both books cover the strategic challenges that face American policymaking and offer useful inputs to improvise on the existing approach. Both present balanced perspectives. The work by the Schaffers is a behavioural study while McGrath's account is a descriptive analysis for an integrated approach to defeat the al-Qaeda network. McGrath has meticulously researched al-Qaeda before making his recommendations. The Schaffers have drawn heavily upon personal and professional experience in the subcontinent as part of their diplomatic assignments.

PRIYANKA SINGH

Associate Fellow

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

New Delhi

★ ★ ★

Sashi Tharoor, *Pax Indica: India and the World of the 21st Century*, (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2012), Pages: 456, Price: Rs. 799.

The title of Shashi Tharoor's new book, *Pax Indica*, can mislead an unwary reader. The book does not offer a blueprint for India's rise to imperial status in the current century. A more modest role is envisaged for India, that of helping to define the norms of tomorrow's new networked world, write the rules and have a voice in their application. But the book is not really about this either. It is more an overview of India's relations with its neighbours, South-East Asia, China, the US, the Arab countries, Africa, Europe, and Latin America, with separate chapters on India and the UN and Soft Power and Public Diplomacy, and a final chapter on Multi-Alignment as a "Grand Strategy" for India in the decades ahead.

The new norms and rules that India would work on, how they would be different from the ones that the West considers universal, and the means India will deploy to achieve success are not spelt out in the book. In actual fact, the author believes that the world having been made "safe of democracy", India's vocation should be the promotion of democracy and human rights world wide along with "major allies" like the US. This suggests adjusting to Western norms more than redefining them, which is in fact what the West expects of others.

The reader would have greater than usual interest in Tharoor's latest book because he would be writing from a double perspective – that of his long experience in international diplomacy as a UN civil servant and a brief exposure at the political level to India's foreign-policymaking as a junior Minister in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). However, rather than this double experience combining to give more cohesion to his analysis of India's foreign policy in the current century, it produces some inconsistencies.

An instance of this is the disproportionate attention given to groups such as BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) and the IOC-ARC (the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation) and the exaggerated enthusiasm with which their potential is described. The eight pages devoted to BIMSTEC contrast with one paragraph each that Japan and South Korea merit, and the less than three pages of superficial treatment of Russia. While Europe gets the same space as BIMSTEC, the author considers the continent irrelevant to India's strategic interests. He claims that "there's nothing like the IOC-ARC in the annals of global diplomacy" and rhapsodizes thus in UN-speak:

When the IOC-ARC meets, new windows are opened between countries separated by distance as well as politics. Malaysians talk with Mauritians, Arabs with Australians, South Africans with Sri Lankans, Iranians with Indonesians. The India Ocean serves as both a sea separating them and a bridge binding them together.

Doesn't the UN at New York do all this too?

Some other inconsistencies in the book probably derive from the author's reluctance as a former Minister and Congress Member of Parliament to criticize the government's policies. Tharoor's analysis of the roots of Pakistan's deep-seated hostility towards India is most perspicacious and hard-headed, but even as the reader is being convinced that Pakistan cannot be trusted and dialoguing with it would not be productive, the author dutifully purveys all the contestable arguments of the government to justify resuming the dialogue, adding some jejune ones of his own, such as "what we say when we talk that will make the difference" and that a dialogue allows India to make clear to Pakistan "its bottom lines and minimum standards of civilized conduct". He is very dismissive about the India-Pakistan Track-2 dialogues, but slips into candlelight phraseology in advocating a show of "magnanimity and generosity of spirit that in itself stands an outside chance of persuading Pakistanis to rethink their attitude to us". Homilies such as "To acknowledge that trust does not exist right now, however, is not to suggest that trust can never be built" and that "The time has come ... for the victims of geography to *make* history" cannot be the basis of serious policy. He does not explain how but wants "New Delhi to do its best to ensure that the Islamabad establishment abandons the conviction that terrorism is the only effective instrument that obliges India to sit up and pay attention to Pakistan and engage with its interests". Rather surprisingly for a UN hand, he believes India can have sanctions imposed on Pakistan under UN Chapter VII resolutions on terrorism, overlooking that the US, despite serious Pakistani provocations, has not used this instrument against Pakistan and any action in the UN Security Council will need US and Chinese assent.

The author is right to affirm that India is no longer in the same league as China economically, but some of his other views on India-China relations are debatable. He seems to believe, without any apparent basis, that India has a genuine strategic partnership with China and that this relationship has broadened to include "the wider civil society in both nations". His view that Chinese and Indian economies are complementary will be contested by those



who argue that the relationship has become colonial-like in structure – export of raw materials versus import of manufactured goods. He visualizes India-China cooperation on nuclear disarmament when China refuses to hold nuclear parleys with India because it does not consider the latter a nuclear power. His repeated assertions that China and India have a common interest in keeping sea lanes open overlook India's strategic concerns about China's increased presence in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea imbroglio. The author is absolutely right about enhancing relations between India and Taiwan.

The chapter on the US is a mixture of several sharp insights and questionable assumptions. At one point the author notes Obama's "substantive assurance" of support for India's permanent membership of the Security Council and at another he characterizes it as "largely symbolic" and a "rhetorical flourish". (In the chapter on the UN and global commons he gives an excellent analysis of the issues involved in expanding the Security Council in both permanent and non-permanent categories.) How the two countries can cooperate to counter nuclear proliferation is not explained. To say that there is no real clash between India and the US on "geopolitical fundamentals" is exaggerating the degree of convergence. It is debatable whether the relationship with India is going to be as important to American security as that with Europe once was. India and the US, the author says, "share a responsibility for preserving a rule-based open and democratic order" and the global commons, without clarifying the nature of this responsibility and who would define it because India itself has not done it so far. His belief that India and the US as the two principal democracies have special interests and responsibilities exaggerates India's willingness to assume such a global role and overlooks the United States' historical and continuing courting of authoritarian states in its larger national interest.

Tharoor rightly underlines the importance of India's relations with the Arab world because of critical energy, trade, human resources and remittance links. But to say that the centuries-old India-Arab links have given the peoples on the two sides "a similarity of perceptions and cultural mores" is an obvious exaggeration, as is the assertion that "our geopolitical aspirations are entirely compatible". On Iran, the Shia-Sunni issue, and the role of Saudi Arabia and Qatar in Libya and Syria this is not true. That Iran has been a "kindred spirit of India" on Pakistan, that it is a "friend at Court" in the Islamic world and that it considers India a useful source of "high technology" is not supported by facts.

Africa and Latin America get the requisite attention in the book. While the overview is informative, India's sentiments towards Africa are expressed in extraordinarily mushy language:

India and Africa have been close to each other for so many centuries that our relationship is not one of immediate give and take but has been that of a family where each one provides the best advice, the best support and the best sharing of experience, so that when we walk the same path, we learn from each other and do not make the same mistakes.

Tharoor exaggerates the impact of India's soft power on the current century, using mellifluous prose to make his point. While India's democracy and pluralism, its composite culture, management of diversity, Bollywood et al. earn it respect, how can India be the "land of the better story" globally with its dysfunctional democracy, poor governance, abysmal levels of poverty, low human welfare indices, urban decay, lack of sanitation, etc.? On page 410 he himself lists India's dramatic underperformance in many areas. Tharoor ignores the hard-power foundation of soft power acknowledged by Robert Nye, the originator of the concept of "soft power".

The author's views on the MEA, which he mockingly calls the Ministry of Eternal Affairs, are unflattering. The well-known shortcomings of the Ministry which he lists – to which international attention has been drawn by a US researcher – cannot be denied. While the Ministry is manifestly understaffed, mid-level lateral entry on a large scale is not an answer. Where will competent mid-level recruits come from? A successful remodelling of the MEA has to be part of an overall administrative services reform. The author explains well the ineffectual role of Parliament in foreign affairs and he is right about the centralization of foreign policy decisions on important issues in the PMO.

Not surprisingly, Tharoor deplores the non-aligned phase of India's foreign policy. In his view, Indian diplomacy is concerned more with principles than interests, privileging intellect over interest and process over outcome, but he does not give any example to sustain this sweeping generalization. He wants India to adopt a gentler and more accommodative tone on the multilateral high table, an advice that would not appeal to those who recall the hectoring of India during the CTBT negotiations and have heard the rantings of some Ambassadors in the Security Council on Libya, Iran and Syria.

Tharoor's version of India's "grand strategy" would see us in the US-led camp of liberal democracies besieged by Islamist terrorism and Chinese authoritarianism, forgetting that it is the US that has propped Islamism and

China in the first place. He wants India to “be true to its soul in the multilateral arena” and espouse vigorously the “Community of Democracies”, though this would require reconciliation with the rationale of India’s adherence to political groups like RIC (Russia-India-China) and BRICS. Tharoor is wary of multipolarity; but mutli-alignment, which he strongly recommends as the axis of India’s future foreign policy, presupposes a diffusion of power within the international system and recognition that in the absence of an international consensus on the promotion of the Western agenda of democracy and human rights, which many countries see as selective and geopolitically driven, India has to maintain a balance between different approaches to such fundamental issues as respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, regime change policies and concepts like the right to intervene and protect.

Tharoor decries the fact that India’s “old obsession with strategic autonomy remains”. In his view, “strategic autonomy is all very well, but it cannot be the be-all and end-all of India’s attitude to the world”. While he cautions against antagonizing the US for maintaining energy supplies from Iran, he affirms somewhat inconsistently that “no power on earth can presume to dictate to India on any international issue”. India has “more in common with the countries of the North than the global South”, he says, contradicting his own paeans to BIMSTEC, IOR-ARC, IBSA and relations with Africa, the Arab world, Latin America, India’s neighbours, and, to boot, East Timor.

In virtually every chapter Tharoor quotes extensively David Malone (seventeen times), a former Canadian envoy to India, to buttress his views. His “internationalism” probably explains the need for such external endorsement of his thinking on key facets of India’s foreign policy.

KANWAL SIBAL

Former Ambassador of India to France and Russia  
Former Foreign Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs

New Delhi



Rumel Dahiya and Ashok K. Behuria eds., ***India's Neighbourhood: Challenges in the Next Two Decades*** (New Delhi: Pentagon Security International, 2012), Pages: 226, Price: Rs. 995.

This edited volume is a welcome attempt to peep into the future of a large tract of land and its people containing nine countries surrounding India. Among these countries, one comes across a wide variety of political entities and economic systems with huge differentials in their size, governing structure, economic wherewithal and military capabilities.

Making trend analyses of all these assorted groups of countries is indubitably a staggering task, since the list includes an emerging superpower, a suspected failed state, a country facing existential threat due to coming environmental disaster, and a group of small states sharing borders with mighty neighbours. Nonetheless, a group of scholars from the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses has made a commendable effort to examine the challenges and opportunities for India in the next twenty years in its immediate neighbourhood. While seven out of the nine countries included in this volume are South Asian countries and are members of SARRC, the editors have rightly included China and Myanmar, which share land borders with India.

This volume has several positive elements. One of them is the methodological uniformity in that all of the chapters raise a set of relevant questions, seek to answer those queries, examine the main drivers that may affect the events and issues in those countries in the coming years, provide various scenarios that one could contemplate and, significantly, provide a set of recommendations to the Indian foreign policy establishment.

Secondly, different authors specializing in one country each and generating field data to complement their secondary data have done their best to analyse key issues in these countries that may affect Indian security and economy in the coming years. In a single-authored book, one scholar alone would have forecast the future trends. The collective effort has made the job relatively trouble-free and combined the group wisdom to indicate future challenges for India in its neighbourhood.

Thirdly, the contributors to this book are relatively young scholars. More seasoned analysts have a tendency to become prisoners of the past, and while they certainly emit knowledge and wisdom, also become overcautious in looking at the future.

However, in the reverse order of thinking, one gets an impression that the younger group of scholars have missed the beauty and the brain of historical analysis. Winston Churchill said, “Study history, study history. In history lie all the secrets of statecraft.” Churchill strongly believed that the farther one would like to see the future, the deeper one had to go into the past.

The authors have clearly forecast an array of challenges that need the attention of the Indian government of today to be better prepared for tomorrow! The most prominent of them, of course, surrounds the indeterminate role of China in the region. Almost all the chapters have warned of a rising Chinese presence in the region as a notable development now and a challenge in the future. While China’s expanding footprint can be seen across continents, India needs to factor the growing desire of its neighbours to welcome China sometimes at the cost of Indian interests.

The second important issue highlighted by the book is the likely anarchy in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Western military forces from that country and India’s stakes in that country.

The third one is the possibility of state implosion in Pakistan. What can India do in case of a balkanized Afghanistan and/or a disintegrated Pakistan in the coming years? Such speculations are controversial and foreign policy analysts in India refrain from airing their views in public, but this book has made a bold analysis of such possible scenarios.

The fourth significant likely development is mass migration from Bangladesh and Maldives in the wake of environmental disasters. Can the already overpopulated India manage such a demographic burden?

Last but not least is the phenomenon of rising anti-India sentiments in some neighbouring countries. Significantly, one witnesses growing pro-China feelings in some of these countries as well. Its implication for Indian national interests should not be underestimated and strategies to deal with anti-Indianism in South Asia must be devised in time.

As mentioned by Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai while releasing the book on 13 July 2012, it is a “result of a unique collaborative effort between the Ministry of External Affairs and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses” – the study having been commissioned by the Foreign Office. “The intention is to focus attention on the challenging policy environment in our immediate neighbourhood; the intention is also to provoke a debate, and hopefully a lively debate, both within India and beyond its borders”, he added.

If, as expressed by the Foreign Secretary, the aim of the book is to “generate ideas and solutions” and “be able to think out of the box”, it is certainly a welcome initiative.

While the book deserves kudos for bringing these and other issues of concern to notice in one single volume, some of the recommendations are not beyond critical thinking. Impractical and overly optimistic suggestions require revision. It has been suggested in the Introduction itself, for example, that “... India should maintain contacts with all sides in Afghanistan, deepen people-to-people contacts but remain cautious about getting bogged down in the country. The prescription is wait and watch.” Here, how does one “wait and watch” and simultaneously “maintain contacts with all sides” and “deepen people-to-people contacts”? Secondly, the suggestion to “build and nurture friendly constituencies in Pakistan” will remain a pipedream in the next twenty years. In fact, the moment the Pakistani Establishment comes to know that India is seeking to “nurture” a constituency within its territory, it will let all hell loose. This is a recommendation that can work only after some kind of an Indo-Pak *détente* matures. Another assertion, that “If India is able to stabilize its own part of J&K, the salience of Kashmir in Indo-Pak relations might diminish, making it easier for India to deal with Pakistan.” The fact remains that a significant aspect of instability in J&K is due to conspiracies and incitements from across the border. Can India stabilize its part of J&K without change in Pakistan’s policy?

These are highly debatable issues and the book is chockfull of such assertions and recommendations. But then the purpose of such writings is to promote debate and understanding. To that extent, this volume has made a fine attempt to provoke further thinking on the options available to India to tackle the challenges of the future and reap benefits from the opportunities available in its immediate neighbourhood. One striking observation of the authors relates to the growing stake of Indian states in the country’s policy towards the neighbouring countries. The recommendation to the Government of India to factor “the interests of populations in the bordering states” while crafting initiatives or responding to developments in neighbouring countries is a very welcome proposition.

What could have been a worthy additional chapter is a theme related to regionalism. India has not only been an active promoter of regional cooperation but also has attempted sub-regional groupings to build friendly ties with countries in various permutations and combinations. The authors are certainly in favour

of a comprehensive and well-rounded Indian policy on the neighbourhood. Thus a chapter on it focusing on the challenges and opportunities of regional cooperation could have been an excellent value addition.

CHINTAMANI MAHAPATRA  
Professor, American Studies Programme  
Centre for Latin American, US and Canadian Studies  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi

★ ★ ★