

BOOK REVIEW

Nukhbah Taj Langah, *Poetry as Resistance: Islam and Ethnicity in Postcolonial Pakistan* (New Delhi: Routledge, 2012), Pages : 271, Price: Rs 695.00.

One of the strategies adopted by ‘the establishment’ in Pakistan to prevent Nawaz Sharif from coming to power was to divide Punjab, the most populous province of Pakistan and pocket borough of Sharifs, into smaller provinces. This was to be achieved by creating a province for South Punjab or Bahawalpur, or both. For a long time, the Siraiki-speaking population in Southern Punjab has been agitating for the creation of a Siraiki province. However, ‘the establishment’ perceives that a Siraiki province will provide further fillip to various ethno-linguistic fires already ablaze in Pakistan and hence, it wants to resurrect the Bahawalpur state and create a Southern Punjab state, a geographical entity without any ethnic connotations. The Parliamentary Commission on New Provinces recommended the creation of the ‘Bahawalpur Janoobi Punjab’ province, which, if created would not be linguistically homogenous and would not completely satisfy the aspirations of the Siraiki-speaking population, even though they would arguably be a majority in the new province. Unlike ‘Siraikistan’, the new geographical entity would have lessened the pressure on the government to merge the Siraiki-speaking regions of Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (KP) into the new province, a proposition that the government in Peshawar has strongly rejected. However, the election results have indicated that the demand for a mere geographical province devoid of ethno-linguistic identity is not supported by the population. In fact, the election results and the huge victory by Nawaz Sharif’s supporters in the region have raised serious questions about the strength of Siraiki nationalism.

The Pakistani state right from its creation in 1947 has had problems with the ethnic aspirations of its population. It has often tried to subsume the ethnic identities of its populace within an all-inclusive Islamic identity. As the Mohajir and Punjabi elites have dominated the Pakistani polity, they have tried to perpetuate a domination of their *lingua franca*, namely Urdu and Punjabi. They have generally refused to accommodate the linguistic aspirations of other ethnic groups. Siraiki is spoken by a large population in Southern Punjab, who consider themselves to be a separate ethno-linguistic group and have been demanding a separate state since the 1960s. Although, Siraiki speakers inhabit parts of Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa, the

heartland of Siraiki culture remains the former princely state of Bahawalpur. Like other ethnic minorities in Pakistan, the Siraikis argue that their culture is being suppressed and their economic resources are being exploited by Punjab. They demand usage of their language in official documents, on radio and television.

Within Punjab, the bulk of jobs and funds are cornered by Northern and Central Punjab. Consequently, the Siraikis have been demanding quotas in jobs and the formation of a Siraiki regiment in the army. The region has hardly any industries and continues to be underdeveloped despite producing a substantial proportion of cotton and wheat, the two main crops of Pakistan. The region has not been compensated for the loss of the waters of the Sutluj and the Beas, which used to flow through the region. The Siraikis feel that their distinctive ethno-linguistic identity has been suppressed by the civil and military establishment of Pakistan, which has been dominated by the Punjabis. They attribute this to their under-representation in the Pakistani bureaucracy and the army, which recruits primarily from Northern Punjab. Many Punjabis contend that Siraiki is not a distinct language, but merely a dialect of Punjabi. Islamicised political groups have in any case tried to undermine the ethno-linguistic identities of the populace, as they have viewed linguistic nationalism as the very negation of the 'Two Nation Theory'. Consequently, they have always attempted to promote an all-inclusive Islamic identity to subsume all ethno-linguistic identities in Pakistan.

Nukhbah, an Assistant Professor of English at Forman Christian College, University Lahore, is the daughter of Taj Muhammad Langah, President of the Pakistan Siraiki Party, who has been espousing the Siraiki cause for a long time. The book is based on her PhD thesis titled, 'Expressing Resistance through Siraiki Poetry in Postcolonial Pakistan'. She has tried to analyse the vital issues of the Siraiki ethno-linguistic identity as seen through the prism of Siraiki literature, especially poetry written in recent decades. She has looked at other forms of folk art to espouse the cause of a distinctive Siraiki cultural identity. The book highlights the evolution of the Siraiki language in post-colonial Pakistan from its relative obscurity under the British. It explains how a literary movement turned into a political movement with the mapping of its territorial frontiers.

The book offers rare insight into British policies, which led to the exploitation of the Siraiki people in their traditional lands to promote the settlement of 'martial' Punjabis from East Punjab. Successive Pakistani regimes have followed these colonial practices by giving most government jobs to outsiders and forcing the locals to move out and learn other languages. The

author contends that the hopes that this would dilute the Siraiki identity in due course were belied, and on the contrary, this discrimination led to the consolidation of the Siraiki identity. Literary movements like Jashn-e-Farid and 'All Pakistan Siraiki Conference' were used to consolidate the linguistic identity of the Siraikis and prevent it from being relegated as a dialect of Punjabi by the Pakistani authorities. Siraiki poets provided it further fillip by using poetry to give vent to their frustration against Punjabi domination. They also drew a clear line between the oppressor and the oppressed. With the passage of time, this resulted in the strengthening of Siraiki nationalism and its cartographic manifestation in the form of a map of 'Siraikistan', which included not only parts of Punjab, but also that of Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa. The book also points towards Siraiki activists' latent support for Sindhi and Baloch nationalisms and that probably explains the exclusion of Siraiki-speaking regions of Sindh and Balochistan from the map of 'Siraikistan'.

The book is extremely well researched and is a treasure trove of information, not only as far as Siraiki nationalism is concerned but also about the apprehensions of Baloch, Sindhi and Pakhtoon nationalisms vis-a-vis Punjabi-Mohajir hegemony. The smaller provinces, namely, Sindh, Balochistan and KP are quite keen on the creation of a Siraiki province, as it would drastically reduce the pre-eminence of Punjab in the body politic of Pakistan. It also explains the politics behind various discourses in favour of division of Punjab. The author however, has her biases and being part of a Siraiki nationalist family has a soft corner for the cause. There are some minor errors, which should have been eliminated during editing and are usually not expected from an eminent publishing house like Routledge.

Despite some very minor flaws, the book is a must read not only for those who want to know about the Siraiki language, movement and Siraiki nationalism, but also for those keen to study the ethno-linguistic sub-nationalism in Pakistan and its future trajectory.

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Man Mohini Kaul , Vibhanshu Shekhar (Eds.) ***India And New Zealand In A Rising Asia: Issues And Perspectives*** (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012), Pages : XIV + 201, Price: Rs. 895.00.

The book proclaims, on the inner front cover, to be “the first Indian effort towards understanding various dimensions of India-New Zealand relationship in the context of the rising power of Asian Countries ... to develop an Indian perspective on New Zealand as an actor and a stakeholder in the global and regional politics of the Asia-Pacific region”. This succinct introduction by the editors perhaps explains the rapid emergence of India as a rising power in the Asia–Pacific in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and its “greater economic integration and multifaceted strategic engagement with every country in the region”. It is pointed out that a similar level of enhanced strategic engagement could be perceived in India’s engagement with New Zealand, “...one of the most important players in the south Pacific and an ardent advocate of regional concerns”.

The book should indeed inspire many more academics and analysts in India, and in New Zealand, to further interpret and explore the profound political and diplomatic dimensions of the relations in the newly challenging era of globalization. The introductory chapter digs deeply and insightfully into how both India and New Zealand had long “looked at the world as well as at each other from different lenses” during the cold war period, with relations plummeting, resulting even in the closure of its High Commission in New Delhi in 1981 by the government of Robert Muldoon.

The credit for putting India-New Zealand on the irreversible path of mutual understanding and cooperation goes to the then Labour Prime Minister David Lange (1984-89) who appointed the popular Everest hero Edmund Hillary as the High Commissioner to re-open the mission. The Indo-New Zealand relations, notwithstanding the irritants over the nuclear issues and occasional hiccups over avoidable “imperious” Kiwi remarks on complex Indo-Pak imbroglios, have ever since been on an ascendant curve.

The first chapter, “India in New Zealand’s Asia Policy” by Man Mohini Kaul most appropriately opens by quoting the ringing remark made in 1980s by the then PM David Lange that his country’s foreign policy was being, “...increasingly shaped by the reality of our location. We now not only accept but celebrate what the map tells us...that we are a South Pacific nation”. Prof Kaul has chronicled New Zealand’s Asia Policy; rise of China

and India; developments in the South China Sea and its wider security implications and India's stakes in the South Pacific. The critical role of Australia and the USA in New Zealand's "security policies and strategic posture" has been examined with reference to the significant recent developments including the US-led war against terror, and commitments under relevant Treaties and Declarations.

India-New Zealand bilateral relationship is discussed at length detailing the setback when New Zealand criticised India's nuclear tests of May 1998. It is rightly observed, "...the pursuit of close relations with India seems to have softened New Zealand's stand on India's civil nuclear programme". The joint statement during PM John Key's visit to India in June 2011 stated, "Both sides share the vision of a nuclear weapon free world. New Zealand welcomes increased engagement between India and the multilateral export control regimes".

The second chapter, "New Zealand's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century" by Vibhanshu Shekhar traces the roots of forces driving the more recent evolution of patterns and priorities of external relations of New Zealand. He concludes that the growing prominence of the eastern Asian hemisphere, China's increasing influence and her mending of fences with the USA are clearly identifiable essentials before policy planners in Wellington.

The third chapter, "Does the FTA Really Matter? Trends in India-New Zealand Economic Relations" by Nabeel A. Mancheri examines how the finalization of the proposed Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) would lead to greater economic cooperation and investment for both sides.

The article in the fourth chapter "India's Engagement with New Zealand: What ails the Relationship" by Rupakjyoti Borah refers to three negative factors, namely, insufficient involvement of the Indian diaspora; New Zealand's strong stand on the NSG-waiver to India and stagnation of items of trade from India. The list of remedies suggested include: (i) New Zealand addressing India's peculiar security situation; (ii) More cooperation between two armed forces; (iii) New Zealand devoting more resources to studies on India; (iv).sharing "real time intelligence" on terrorism and on the Indian Ocean; and (v) more collaboration in regions like Southeast Asia. However, this article is replete with over simplistic views of complex issues of foreign policy involving sovereign nations.

The ramifications of the role of the Indian community in New Zealand, 105,000 in their total population of 4.2 million (in 2006), as a factor in the

bilateral relations has been discussed in the fifth chapter by Ganganath Jha. The influential Fijian-origin Indian Diaspora - many among them locally educated and overall better equipped to adapt - is the strength as well as the source of split. There has been an increase in migration of more Indian professionals of technical and managerial category in recent years – the 2001 census had the figure of 24 per cent employed in the retail business and 44 per cent in white-collar jobs. New Zealand has been extra generous in promoting the socio-cultural aspirations of the community. The gurudwaras, temples, mosques and community centres have been facilitated to multiply under ‘multiculturalism as state policy’. The appointment of Sir Anand Satyanand, of Indo-Fijian origin, as Governor General (2006-2011) has been hailed as a rare example for a white majority nation. It may be underscored that the Indians in New Zealand who are more ambitious and big dreamers continue to move to lands of larger economies like Australia and Canada. The academics are perhaps, often prone to conjure up a more “magnified” role for the Indian diaspora than warranted by the overall realities. This factor was interestingly, underlined by two eminent panelists at the function of the release of the book.

The stimulating subject of “Multiculturalism in New Zealand: Reality or Rhetoric” has been competently dealt with in the sixth chapter by G. Vijay Kumar Reddy and P. Krishna Mohan Reddy. They explain the history of the concept of “multiculturalism” as enunciated “in the 1970’s in Canada and Australia as a key plank of government policy to assist in the management of ethnic pluralism within the national polity”. It is pointed out, “...multiculturalism in New Zealand is a challenge not only because it is complex but also because New Zealand is the only country which is officially committed to biculturalism through its founding document in 1840... Treaty of Waitangi between the Maori and the British Crown”. While some scholars optimistically suggest ways of “accommodating multiculturalism” within a bilateral framework, skeptics point out that “in the case of New Zealand, biculturalism is an obligation while multiculturalism is a vague idea”. The concept of “New Zealander” has been continuously in flux since the Europeans arrival in the beautiful “edge of the world”. The meticulous records of arrivals and departures of the recent international migratory flows could be interpreted as a pointer towards a trend of “Asianisation” of New Zealand.

The essay on, “Tackling Terrorism: The New Zealand Way” by journalist Renu Sharma recounts the various legislative and security measures particularly in the wake of 9/11 and the US-led “War on terror”, though the threat perception

of direct attack is low in New Zealand.

The eighth chapter titled, “New Zealand-China Relations in the 21st Century: NZ Perspective on Rising China” by Anushri Chakraborty highlights how “over the last three decades, China has become New Zealand’s foreign policy priority” and how the Asian superpower has been more recently perceived as an over-arching arbiter in the Asia Pacific regional architecture. A significant reference is quoted from the Defence White Paper 2010 with the New Zealand Government assessing India’s growing power as “more an opportunity for New Zealand than a threat”. Similar optimism is noticeably absent while assessing Wellington’s “special relationship” with China. PM Helen Clark’s interview in 2003 to *The Guardian* is recalled for her opposition to the Iraq War “because it set a precedent of large powers ignoring the United Nations and international law”. She used China as an example of exactly to whom this might set a bad example.

The ninth chapter “India and New Zealand: the Evolving Domain in East Asian Community Building” on the evolving new global order and multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific, traces the paths of India and New Zealand towards closer relations in bilateral, ASEAN and East Asian Summit forums.

New Zealand’s re-engagement with the United States has been analysed in the tenth chapter by Ruth Rhea Khan. It is correctly assessed that altered realities of global security and prosperity have made “both the Pacific countries realize that correcting the past differences are essential” and PM John Key is quoted saying that US-NZ relationship has “come of age”. It will however, be Secretary Hillary Clinton’s remark that NZ is a country that “punches way above its weight” - after signing the agreement to bring the two countries a little more closer, would continue to resound.

The evolution of closer partnership in New Zealand’s relations with South East Asia is competently chronicled in the eleventh chapter.

The final chapter “South China Sea Dispute: Policy Options for India and New Zealand” by Amit Singh, examines how “the recent upsurge in tensions in the SCS has turned the issue into a major regional security flashpoint with global consequences”. After dwelling upon the high stakes of the ASEAN and the USA, the perceptions of New Zealand and India are examined with the conclusion that New Delhi and Wellington have symmetry of interests and “should support each other’s efforts in achieving the peaceful resolution of the SCS in keeping the sea lanes open”.

In summary, the book under review is indeed a valuable addition to path breaking scholarship about the relationship between India and New Zealand.

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Nalinikant Jha and Subhash Shukla (eds.), *India's Foreign Policy: Emerging Challenges* (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012), Pages: xxxvi+295, Price: Rs. 995.00.

The problem with reviewing edited books is that there cannot be a general appreciation or criticism as each write-up has its own specificities, both in positive and negative contexts. This is more so when a book has as many as 21 chapters - grouped in five rubrics.

In the introductory *Overview*, Shibashish Chatterjee writes extensively on the hitherto existing theories on foreign policy. One may differ in perception but the in-depth analysis by the writer cannot be denied. He says it is essential to understand that the structure and the units "are not free standing"; they "constitute each other ... there is hardly a pure structural effect" (p. 6). Secondly, the postulation that "the constraints and opportunities of the system structure are invariably filtered through domestic level variables" (p. 6) especially the later is particularly debatable because of the use of the word "invariable". The author highlights the implications of disintegration of Soviet Union, which shifted global order from bipolarity to unipolarity; Iraq and Afghan war in the post-Cold war era being a test in case (p. 8); with prediction of China (only) having "the assets to turn into superpower in future" (p. 9). The author claims that the extension of the Sino-Indian rivalry can be seen in the Southeast Asian region and continental Australia, particularly in the context of India's Look East policy (p. 14). Classifying the dominant discourse in the Indian foreign policy as pragmatist and maximalist, he is optimistic that with time both would be "more attentive to India's domestic bases of grand strategy, in both their cognitive explanations and policy recommendations" (p. 20).

In his futuristic analysis, Partha S. Ghosh has taken far too many sub-heads like socio-economic indicators both positive - like secularism, economy, (pp. 23-24) and negative - like casteism, communalism, regional disparities (p. 25), poverty (p. 26), education (p. 27), demography (pp. 28-29) to be able to do justice to all the topics. On the contrary, it takes the attention away from the foreign policy domain, to which it returns only in the end with the conclusion that notwithstanding "all the din and bustle ... democracy would push India forward, though the pace may not be as fast as China" (p. 34). Such an assertion seems out of place as China-India comparison in the context of democracy hardly holds any water. His comments on foreign policy dynamics say nothing new in the context of neighbours. Comments on India's chances in the Security Council despite its growing military power and on

improvement in China – US relations after President Bush’s and President Hu Jintao’s visit (p. 33), are also rather sweeping.

R.S. Yadav traces paradigm shifts in the post-Cold War Indian foreign policy. The order is “multi level interdependence” and resembles a complex “three-dimensional chess game”, he says. Whereas at one level, the world order is unipolar, at another level US is not a hegemonic power (as it has to bargain on equal terms with EU); and at the third level, transnational relations include non-state actors like bankers and cross-border terrorists etc who are all outside the control of the governments (p. 37). This, in turn, has led India aligning with major powers, in place of its earlier policy of non-alignment, transforming into “strategic partnerships”; seeking regional cooperation; and pursuing economic diplomacy. He warns against a complete departure from idealism, “...without the guiding forces of principles, naked power is likely to have dangerous consequences for the world” (p. 42). The otherwise well written article moves from specific to general and becomes very vague at the end when it seeks new orientations to suit both “short and long term” goals (p. 43).

Mohan B. Pillai and Mohan Joshi talk more of a shift in economy than in the Indian foreign policy. Written within the framework of Marxism, it supports the dependency school, which according to them “raises relevant questions” (p. 50) and the liberal perspectives fail to address them. Seen from the limited lens, they say “the debate over rejuvenating the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as a counter hegemonic strategy for a new world order overlooks the very politics of NAM during the welfare capitalist phase” (p. 52).

The second section is entitled *Managing Global Balance of Power*. N.K. Jha in his write-up on Indo-US relations traces the changing contours of the relationship, albeit simplistically, partly because of the scope of the article itself. He says the initial turns in the relationship and the US’ favourable proclivities towards China (calling Tibet an integral part and maintaining silence on human rights issue) frustrated India; and further, linking Kashmir with Pakistan’s cooperation on Afghanistan was seen as “exceptionally serious” (p. 59). Later on, proactive diplomacy by India changed things; factors like Manmohan Singh’s visit, External Affairs Minister SM Krishna’s 2010 visit, and finally Obama’s visit in November 2010 played constructive roles and the Indo-US relations moved on a positive track.

Purushottam Bhattacharya in his article feels the US occupies a pre-eminent position in both India’s and Europe’s foreign policies (p. 78). Although on 9/11, the US preferred going unilaterally as against a multilateral response

preferred by Europe; “consequently, the US picked and chose allies from the coalition for the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq” (p. 79). Analysing India and Europe’s relations in the context of its membership of NSG (p. 85), he concludes that India and Europe “need to join forces as natural partners in their own strategic interests to ensure effective multilateralism and meet global challenges” (p. 87), and recommends other steps like building on the Asian Economic Community and “development of fruitful partnerships with Russia, China and Japan along with the same with Europe” (p. 87). The analysis is timely, reflects a different perspective although conclusions could have been elaborated upon.

N.K. Jha and S. Prabhakar trace the impact of the Soviet disintegration on Indo-Russian relations by describing the importance the US got in the Russian foreign policy, reflected in the cryogenic deal cancellation with India in 1993 (pp. 90–91). Soon things changed with Yeltsin’s visit to India, Narasimha Rao’s Moscow visit in 1994, and more significantly, the Russian defence minister’s visit in 1996 (p. 93). The upward trend continued with Deve Gowda’s and Gujral’s visits as well as that of Mulayam Singh in 1997; also “Russia’s refusal to join the American-led Western condemnation of India’s nuclear tests in 1998” was evidence of the momentum in India-Russia relations (p. 94). While giving details of the defence and trade prospects, support to India’s permanent membership in the UN, as well as NSG, SCO, APEC, the article is analytical in content. However, it lays too much stress on agreements during the high-level visits. Again, while it highlights the limitations rooted in a weak trade relationship (p. 100) and is correct to say that Russia is a factor in India’s energy interests in Central Asia, the assertion that “India’s developing relations with the US is not creating any challenge for Russia” (p. 101) is debatable, to say the least.

In the next section, *Managing Asian Balance of Power*, Rajan Kumar in his analysis of regional dimensions of Indian security in the background of global power shifts traces the issue of China. After analyzing huge literature, he says that “caught between an increasingly powerful China, and with US fixated on advancing its strategic interests in Asia, India will countenance tough choices in coming years” (p. 112). The article traces a “revisionist” China’s assertiveness, the Sino-Pak axis and its machinations in India’s neighbourhood. However, he says, citing National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon, that China is unlikely to get embroiled in a war. Since 1962, it has desisted from doing so even “when India was vulnerable” in 1965, 1971, and in 1999 (p. 114). The sharp analysis of the overall situation including in the Af-Pak region does not match with the rather general

conclusions like maintaining “balanced approach”, “remaining firm, show maturity” and “potent risks” in “US-centric unidirectional policies” (p. 121).

Rup Narayan Das, in a brief write up has hailed India’s approach to China “reminiscent of Nehru era”, and China’s global diplomacy “enviable by any standard”. He compares India and China to estranged Ambani brothers, saying that together the two countries “breaking the shackles of decades of subjugation and suppression, unleashed their infinite economic powers and potential and challenged the developed economies of the world” (p. 127). Though rhetorically attractive, the assertion is analytically debatable.

In his bid to define mutual interests of India and Japan, Rajaram Panda has a look at rapid changes after the US lifted sanctions in 2001 and the turn in relations with US as well as Japan which had started taking a positive turn since Prime Minister Mori’s visit in 2000 (as well as Clinton’s visit) to India (p. 130). The bilateral dialogue between George Fernandes and Shigeru Ishiba (though not comparable to the Talbott-Singh dialogue) brought positive returns. Trade saw an upswing from \$4 billion in 2002 to \$8 billion in 2006, with FDI reaching \$500 million that year making it the third largest FDI investor (p. 131), and New Delhi becoming the largest recipient of Official Development Assistance (ODA).

The article also discusses the upswing in Japanese strategic options in view of the “galloping economic and military might of China, the nuclear shenanigans of North Korea, threats to the India Ocean and Strait sea-lanes from piracy, terrorism and WMD” (p. 136) and both India and Japan’s common global objective, which is “access to energy resources, keeping international sea lanes safe and free, fighting international terrorism and preventing the proliferation of WMDs”. Further he says that both countries have a common interest in preventing “a hostile, hegemonic power from emerging in the neighbourhood” (p. 137).. It then makes a realistic and pertinent assertion that “should either country drift towards a state of conflict with China, the response of other is unpredictable” (p. 141).

N.K. Jha in his follow up article also discusses China’s disputes with Japan and India and their shared concerns like “China’s space programmes and naval power capabilities”. He goes on to say that both countries may evolve a “joint approach to check China’s growing influence in the region” (p. 145). Strangely, he discusses “countervailing factors”, basically the dependence of the two on China, it being an “offshore manufacturing base” for Japan and an importer for India (p. 148); and again asks India to follow the Panchsheel principles so as to build good relations with both Japan and

China in order to turn the twenty-first century into “the Asian Century”. Without discussing the “hows” of the proposition, the assertion seems disjointed.

Section four, *Seeking Peace and Cooperation with Neighbours*, treats all South Asia, Southeast Asia and West Asia as neighbours; that means immediate, extended and distant neighbours. Mukesh Sabharwal treats India, having all ingredients of regional power, (p. 160), as a sought after member of the ASEAN and the G-8. Making recommendations like reforms in financial and industrial sector and revamping defence spending etc, it says the country “needs to synergise the efforts to defeat terrorism and fundamentalism both internally and external” (p. 160). The article is good as a general introduction.

N.K. Jha, Subhash Shukla and Bibhuti Bhusan Biswas and Rohitashwa Dubey then deal with specific countries: Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka respectively. Jha and Shukla say Kashmir and cross-border terrorism are two major issues between India and Pakistan and that the latter has “failed to swallow the bitter truth that accession (of J&K) to India was legal, complete and final” (p. 164). They blame the Pakistan army for preventing normalisation of relations (p. 170) and argue that for durable peace, dominance of the army should be replaced by civilian supremacy (p. 172). Shukla goes into the details of the geo-strategic imperatives including the issues of trade and transit, the crisis of 1989 beginning with Nepal’s insistence on separate treaties and end of blockade in 1990 (p. 178). Tracing constitutional intricacies, it then deals with developmental challenges, the non-realization of the full potential of the India–Nepal economic cooperation and then socio-cultural ties, he points out how Nepal dislikes the idea of Gurkha recruitment in the Indian army (p. 184). Shukla says implications of issues like “scrapping of 1950 treaty” should not be guided “by narrow political gains” (p. 184) and recommends India to “try to speed up peace process in Nepal so that it should bring about stability there” (p. 185).

Jha and Biswas delve into India-Bangladesh relations, which are dogged by “caution, suspicion and mistrust”. Discussing topography, water relations, illegal migration and shifts in domestic politics, it goes on to analyse Sheikh Hasina’s visit in 2009. In conclusion, they say India “must act like an elder brother” as it needs Bangladesh’s cooperation in realizing its Look East Policy (p. 194) and because of the unparalleled attention that India gets in Bangladesh. Basically, a balanced write up could do with more trade data and analyses.

Dubey discusses the “Tamil Nadu factor in India-Sri Lanka relations saying that it is the “sovereign right of Sri Lanka to eliminate any terrorist organization

that poses a fundamental threat to its survival as a nation” (p. 203), Dubey opines, “...disapproval by India even implicitly ... would weaken the moral authority of India’s own actions in regard to its struggle against terrorism and separatist agitation in Kashmir”. He then recommends that India must use all its diplomatic skills and resources to persuade Colombo to guarantee “life, property, dignity, autonomy and fundamental rights of the Tamil minorities of Sri Lanka” (p. 203). Although limited in scope, the arguments are pointed except perhaps at the end.

Lakhan Lal Mehrotra treats India’s Look East policy as a response to new challenges. He deals with the implications for the North east as well as BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (p. 211) which reflects on relations with Myanmar to credit Look East policy to present India with a multi-faced relationship with societies extending “from Burma to Indonesia” and traces its roots to Nehruvian vision (p. 213).

Pankaj Jha deals with the Look East policy very methodically case by case, giving minor details, more specifics like historical background, multilateral initiatives, defence and strategic cooperation with Malaysia, Singapore, Myanmar, Indonesia, Vietnam, as well as trade and relevance for India’s North East to conclude that “India’s policies should not be dictated by China” (p. 235) and that while the Look East policy is “fruitful” and a “learning experience”, “there is need to launch the next stage of the policy in a much more intensive manner” (p. 236).

Anisur Rehman goes into factors in India’s relations with West Asia. These are economic (trade, investment and joint ventures), energy (two-thirds requirements are met from the region), employment and remittances, and social and cultural factors (including the holy sites of Mecca and Medina). He feels that emerging fields that require attention are education and health (p. 251). He concludes by saying that since “India has variety of intents in West Asia”, there is a need to “further strengthen relations with West Asian countries” (p. 252). Though an analytical and useful piece with facts, it would have been better if the “how to” could also have been elaborated.

In the last section, *Managing Critical Issues*, Inder Nath Mukherjee in his article on the foreign economic policy takes a detailed analytical look at issues. Beginning with the objectives of the Foreign Economic Policy (FEP) (p. 257), he analyses India’s development performance and mobilisation of resources by the government, encouraging FDI in the wake of “sudden and abrupt withdrawal of capital by foreign investors” in 2009 (p. 260) and the

widening and diversifying market access of India. Mukherjee says that even if some sectors were affected adversely by the slowdown, “it continued to grow positively”, including its growth rate (p. 269). Mukherjee has a positive assessment of India’s global role as well as “foreign direct investment and overseas investment policies (which) has enabled it to access technology, while deploying domestic capital more productively” (p. 270).

Amita Aggarwal discusses important issues apart from resources, lists India’s island and ocean territories, explains relevance of the UN Convention on Law of the sea, defines maritime boundaries, gives a list of factors crucial for India in the light of the terror attacks of 9/11 and 26/11, the importance of Pakistan, the Indian navy, oil, non-state actors, the SLOCs, and the US, etc. (pp. 281–82). Though rich in facts, the article economises on analyses.

Keeping two articles, one on foreign economic policy and the other on maritime issues under “critical issues” is difficult to understand. The former could have been easily merged into the first section on overview and the latter in the second section on global balance of power. Unlike the rest of the chapters in the book, the two hardly relate to each other.

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