

Pakistan after Abbotabad

Savita Pande*

At this point in time, it is fairly early to conceptualize a post-Abbotabad Pakistan. The reasons are rooted in the complexity of the operation, terror scenario in Pakistan and the secretive aspects. This paper is an attempt to construct a broad framework (largely from the media, since at the time of writing that is the only source of information available). Given the number of domestic and external variants in the polity of Pakistan, this may not be the final word.

Operation Geronimo entailed the CIA tracking Osama bin Laden to his location in Abbotabad and killing him by Navy SEAL Team Six, a top military counterterrorism unit, flying to the hideout in four helicopters which took off from Jalalabad and refuelled at Tarbela Ghazi before landing at Abbotabad. Osama was living in a three-storey building built on five kanals of land, protected by 20-foot-high walls with barbed wire. He was believed to be living a kilometre from Pakistan's Kakul Military Academy for the past four or five years with his three wives, seven sons and several guards. Osama was shot in the head. Others killed in the operation lasting forty minutes were three men (one believed to be his son and the other two his couriers), and a woman "used as a shield" by a male combatant, and two others injured. The rest were arrested. The operation was secretive and American led. There were no reports of any American being harmed. Osama was buried at sea, ostensibly to prevent the resurrection of a hero or creating a shrine there. No photographs were released. One helicopter crashed at the site.

An ISI official gave the following account of the event:

There were 17–18 people in the compound at the time of the attack. The Americans took away one person still alive, possibly a Bin Laden son. Those who survived

Based on and an updated version of a Guest Lecture delivered at the monthly meeting of the Association of Indian Diplomats, New Delhi, on 23 May 2011.

***The Author** is Professor, Centre for South, Central, Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

the attack included a wife, a daughter and eight to nine other children, not apparently Bin Laden's; all had their hands tied by the Americans. The surviving Yemeni wife said they had moved to the compound a few months ago. Bin Laden's daughter, aged 12 or 13, saw her father shot. It was thought the Americans wanted to take away the surviving women and children but had to abandon the plan when one of the helicopters crashed due to technical snag. The helicopter was destroyed by the Special Forces unit. The US has not commented on anyone it captured or had planned to capture, other than saying it had taken Bin Laden's body.¹

The US held that Pakistan was kept in the dark because a tip-off by them could have alerted Osama to escape. The Pakistani military reportedly took control of the compound only after the operation was completed. Gulmina Bilal maintains that the explanation did not seem "credible" to Pakistanis because for nearly an hour "there was no reaction from the authorities or the civil administration".² Imtiaz Gul says, "The inaction could also imply Islamabad knew of OBL's abode and remained silent so it could get rid of him through the Americans."³

According to Stratfor:

Operational disinformation is the final, critical phase of covert operations.... Obfuscating on how intelligence was developed and on the specifics of how an operation was carried out is an essential part of covert operations. The precise process must be distorted to confuse opponents regarding how things actually played out; otherwise, the enemy learns lessons and adjusts. Ideally, the enemy learns the wrong lessons, and its adjustments wind up further weakening it.⁴

The Pakistani official narrative, clouded in an effort to defend its security and intelligence apparatus, and lauding its own role in the global war on terror was documented in press release number 152/2011 dated 3 May by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It said:

The Government of Pakistan expresses its deep concerns and reservations on the manner in which the Government of the United States carried out this operation without prior information or authorisation. US helicopters entered Pakistani airspace making use of blind spots in the radar coverage due to hilly terrain. US helicopters' undetected flight into Pakistan was also facilitated by the mountainous terrain, efficacious use of latest technology and "nape of the earth" flying techniques.⁵

Basically it was argued that because an attack from Afghanistan was

unexpected, the radar network there was not extensive. An earlier explanation said the radars were “jammed” by superior US technology.

That notwithstanding, the location of the attack and its nature and manner, all led to “more questions than answers”. Fear of implications, tactical as well as strategic, both domestic and external dogged the Pakistani Establishment. Doubts were raised about the extent and nature of Pakistani involvement, particularly considering that the attack came close on the heels of the Davis affair, the killing of two Pakistanis by a CIA contractor in January.

Why Abbotabad?

Maryam Khan Ansari has identified five reasons why Osama chose to reside at Abbotabad: (1) Large, walled compounds are fairly common in the town, so are barbed wires to deter burglars: “burglary is a more common concern than fugitive terrorists”. (2) Abbotabadis are used to many outsiders, including Swatis (after the 2005 earthquake and Taliban attack), TB patients, rich retirees living there. (3) Drug trade leads people to ask fewer questions of otherwise “eccentric” people; fearing a “black money” built label, as there is heavy drug trade in the marijuana growing Abbotabad, people do not dwell on abnormally large buildings, and certainly do not try to explore them. (4) The unpretentious attitudes of the people: Abbotabad is a place where you do not show off and do not act impressed by another’s wealth. (5) The military’s presence. Much has been made of the fact that Abbotabad houses the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) Kakul, which is essentially a gated village where the military officers live and train. People do not “venture out” and nobody “ventures in”, nor do they “care about what goes on outside their gates.”⁶ In addition, the military’s presence “protected the privacy of the compound. Nobody expected the world’s most wanted man to be living near a military base. And if the prospect of the compound being a drug lord’s house was not enough, the average citizen may instead have assumed it was an army building.”⁷

The immediate reaction of an ordinary Pakistani to Osama’s killing varied from “Total Lie: Osama is still alive”; or “he died long ago, only God knows where, when and how”, and “he was killed by the Americans some time ago, somewhere.” The general public was dumbfounded, demanding an answer that actually made sense. Pakistanis, in general, were baffled and peeved at the American action, which was reflected in their criticism, such as that they could not even pronounce Abbotabad:

It’s an Anglo-Saxon word; even Obama calls it “A-bata-bad”! Nor have they

bothered to find out the actual motoring distance between Islamabad and Abbotabad – they keep insisting that it’s “35 miles outside Pakistan’s capital”. Further they don’t know the difference between an ordinary whitewashed three storeyed house and a mansion! They keep calling it a “million-dollar mansion”.⁸

Compiling from various media and internet sources, the daily *News* published as many as thirty-five conspiracy theories that had “sprung up only to ignite heated debates on the more hazy aspects of this most talked about incident.”⁹ The “experts” were placed in three categories. People like Hamid Gul and Orya Maqbool Jan called it a hoax: the deceased was a double of Osama, or “he was dead in Tora Bora... must have shifted to Abbottabad just a week ago”, etc. The second group of analysts viewed the incident as “a complete failure” of the Pakistani security establishment, and painted a very “bleak future” for Pakistan. A third group of commentators referred to the recent high-level meetings between the Pakistani and US intelligence chiefs and contended that the whole operation was carried out with the full support of Pakistan, but Pakistan did not want to take credit in order to shield itself from the likely backlash from jihadi elements.¹⁰

Did Pakistan Know?

Most discussions centred around Pakistan’s possible foreknowledge of the attack. Both the US and Pakistani official versions were that while Pakistan had cooperated on the road to Abbotabad, it was an American operation. Pakistan obviously would not admit knowledge about Osama’s whereabouts.

American officials in various reactions said, some albeit indirectly, that it was not possible that nobody knew. Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, for instance had told a group of Pakistani newspaper editors as early as 2009: “I find it hard to believe that nobody in your government knows where they are and could not get them if they really wanted to.”¹¹ Immediately after the Abbotabad operation, both Hillary and Obama were guarded in their reactions. Announcing Osama’s death, President Obama said that “our counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan helped lead us to bin Laden.” Hillary Clinton said it was “important to note that our counterterrorism cooperation over a number of years now with Pakistan contributed greatly to our efforts to dismantle al-Qaeda. In fact, cooperation with Pakistan helped lead us to bin Laden and the compound in which he was hiding”.¹² During her Pakistan visit she said there was “absolutely no evidence that anyone at the highest level of the Pakistani government” knew where Osama was.¹⁵¹⁵ AFP. : “No Evidence that anyone at the highest level of the Pakistani

government" knew where Osama was.¹³

Defence Secretary Robert Gates said he had seen proof that leaders there were unaware of Osama's whereabouts. He told reporters at the Pentagon:

I have seen no evidence at all that the senior leadership knew. In fact, I've seen some evidence to the contrary.... We have no evidence yet with respect to anybody else. My supposition is, somebody knew.... I think it's a supposition shared by a number in this government that somebody had to know, but we have no idea who, and we have no proof or no evidence.

While not saying who, he suggested it could have been retired or low-level Pakistani officials.¹⁴ Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, "I have seen no evidence that the top leadership knows."¹⁵ John Brennan, President Obama's top counterterrorism adviser, said during a White House briefing that it was "inconceivable that Bin Laden did not have a support system in the country to allow him to stay there for an extended period of time."¹⁶

Senator Joe Lieberman, chair of the Homeland Security Committee, said, "This is going to be a time of real pressure" on Pakistan "to basically prove to us that they didn't know that bin Laden was there."¹⁷ Significantly, the CIA Chief said in an interview to *Time* magazine soon after the Abbotabad operation: "it was decided that any effort to work with the Pakistanis could jeopardize the mission. They might alert the targets".¹⁸

Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State, put the Pakistan dilemma as follows:

It's hard to believe that they (Pakistan) did not know that Bin Laden was there – it's inconceivable – but it's also conceivable to me that somebody in the Pakistani establishment cooperated with us to make this raid possible and didn't want to admit it either. If they admit the first, then they are admitting collusion with the terrorists; if they admit the second, then they admit cooperation with the Americans. Either one of these will hurt the better part of their public.¹⁹

Reactions: Domestic

Domestically, the security agencies (Army and ISI), the President, the Prime Minister and the political parties reacted by scoring points, each keeping its constituency in mind. Thus while the establishment in general was on the defensive, the nuances varied. The Army and the Intelligence were tactically defensive. The Prime Minister and the President strongly defended them. The Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani said after convening a

meeting of corps commanders on the fourth day after the operation that cooperation with the United States would be reviewed if it conducted more such raids.²⁰

At an in camera session held to brief the legislators by the Army and the ISI, the ISI chief, Pasha, admitted intelligence failure. Besieged by the politicians, he offered to resign.²¹ Some members from the opposition benches shouted, "Please accept his resignation."²² This was the third briefing of its kind: the first was in 1988 in the aftermath of the Afghan war and the second was in 2008 when Pakistan initiated action against the Taliban.

At this meeting General Pasha said that the leader of the Opposition, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan of the PML-N (Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz) was criticizing him because he had sought a favour from the ISI chief. He would not disclose what the favour was on the floor of the august house, but would, if asked outside. He went on to say that the Chaudhry's remarks had an adverse impact. On a recent trip to the US he was told by CIA chief Leon Panetta in a meeting: "Look, General Pasha, how can we trust you when your own country's opposition leader is saying that you cannot be believed?"²³ The session resulted in a unanimous resolution condemning the US raid in Abbotabad, calling for the NATO supply route through Pakistan to troops in Kabul to be stopped if the US continued unilateral actions within the country including drone attacks, and calling for an independent commission to be set up to ascertain responsibility for the raid in Abbotabad and the incursion into Pakistan's territory. The composition of the commission was to be decided through consultations between the Prime Minister and the leader of the Opposition.²⁴

President Asif Ali Zardari in an article in the *Washington Post* declared that Osama's killing was "not a joint operation", but years of cooperation with the US led to it. "[O]ur early assistance in identifying an al-Qaeda courier ultimately led to this day." He added that it was a personal affair also: "Twice he tried to assassinate my wife. In 1989 he poured \$50 million into a no-confidence vote to topple her first government. She said that she was bin Laden's worst nightmare – a democratically elected, progressive, moderate, pluralistic female leader. She was right, and she paid for it with her life".²⁵ He also said that Pakistan, a victim of terror, had paid "an enormous price for its stand against terrorism".

During his visit to France soon after the episode, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani put the onus for the failure to locate Osama on the whole world, saying that fighting terrorism was the whole world's responsibility: "There is an intelligence failure of the whole world, not just Pakistan alone ... certainly

we have intelligence sharing with the rest of the world, including the United States, so if somebody points out that there are ... lapses from the Pakistan side, that means there are lapses from the whole world.” He pointed out that more than 30,000 Pakistanis had been killed since the fighting in Afghanistan began.²⁶ In the National Assembly on 9 May, he defended the army and the ISI and rejected the assertions that they were complicit: “No other country in the world and no other security agency has done so much to interdict al-Qaeda than the ISI and our armed forces. It was the ISI that passed key leads to CIA that enabled the US intelligence to use superior technological assets and focus on the area in which Osama bin Laden was eventually found.” He accused the media of playing a divisive role of portraying a false divide between the state institutions of Pakistan. “Pakistan and the US have strategic convergence. The dissonance that finds hype in the media is about operational and tactical matters. It is not unusual to have a different point of view on the methodology to achieve shared objectives.” He declared “the government’s full confidence in the high command of the Pakistan Armed Forces and the Inter Services Intelligence”.²⁷ But while the Prime Minister was trying to convince his audience that the army’s response to the Abbotabad operation was “adequate”, the army chief who was visiting garrisons spoke of lack of information made available to the media and thus the public.

The Opposition generally targeted the President and the Prime Minister. Chaudhry Nisar Khan lamented:

The operation tramples on our honour and dignity, and the President and Prime Minister must either give an explanation or resign. ... The government is keeping silent and there appears to be nobody to respond to propaganda against Pakistan.... Those who are responsible must admit and quit.²⁸

Imran Khan, chairman of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) and former foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi also joined the chorus for Zardari and Gilani to resign.²⁹ Imran Khan announced that his party would stage a sit-in in Karachi on 21 and 22 May to block the NATO supply line and against US drone strikes.³⁰ In an emergency meeting of the party’s Central Executive Committee he blamed the army and civilian leadership for the Abbotabad incident. PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif asked the government to review its relations with the US, and sought from the government an independent commission, having an equal number of members from both the government and Opposition sides, for a free investigation into the incident, in which well-reputed people from the judiciary and civil society could also be included.³¹ Earlier, sparing the government he had blamed the agencies, calling it the

“worst case of negligence and incompetence” by them.³²

In the special session of the National Assembly, Chaudhry Nisar Khan rejected the Prime Minister’s statement as unsatisfactory and demanded an “independent, impartial and above board national commission” to probe how Osama had managed to live in Abbotabad since 2005. To this the Interior Minister Rehman Malik responded with a vehement attack on the PML N: “It was the PML-N that received Rs 130 million from Osama to contest elections against Benazir Bhutto. It was the PML-N that brought Osama to Pakistan from Sudan. It was the PML-N that sent Osama on a C-130 from Peshawar to Afghanistan.”³³

The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) announced on 12 May a countrywide referendum over the Abbotabad operation with seventeen (politically loaded) questions, seeking people’s opinion by 17 May. The MQM Coordination Committee Deputy Convener, Anis Ahmed Qaimkhani said, “The killing of Osama bin Laden in the unilateral American military action inside Pakistan and the post-operation scenario was raising questions over national security, sovereignty and freedom of the country.”³⁴

The immediate reaction of the Islamist parties was, contrary to expectations, limited to consequences. The day after Osama was killed the government reportedly allowed the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which is the public face of the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), to hold funeral prayers in Karachi for him. A few days later the Jamaat-e-Islami organized a mass rally in Lahore, which was attended among others by Imran Khan’s Tehrik-e-Insaaf, the PML-N and the Jamaat-ud-Dawa. Osama was declared a “martyr of Islam” while the government was severely criticized for the US operation.³⁵ Members belonging to the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) offered fateha for Osama in the National Assembly without the permission of the Acting Speaker Faisal Karim Kundi. On a point of order, Maulvi Asmatullah of JUI-F raised his hands for *dua*, and he was followed by two other members of the party.³⁶

Parliamentarians in general did not seem to be in a mood to hold the security establishment accountable

either because of how the army has sent packing those who have even talked of holding independent inquiries on military-related fiascos (prime ministers Junejo and Nawaz Sharif over Ojhri Camp and Kargil (mis)adventure respectively) or perhaps playing power politics the old way of seeking GHQ support ... most parties represented in the Parliamentary Committee on National Security did not deem it necessary to call for the setting up of an independent inquiry commission

to investigate the Abbotabad fiasco.³⁷

In June the government set up a judicial commission headed by Justice Javed Iqbal to probe the incident. The commission was slammed by the Opposition and the legal fraternity, who raised questions over its composition and the procedure adopted to constitute it (the Chief justice was reportedly not consulted for appointing the judge).³⁸

Reactions: External

Compared to the domestic reactions, the external factors were more varied. The immediate US reaction about whether Pakistan knew has already been discussed. White House Press Secretary Jay Carney explicitly stated that the US would not apologize for the Abbotabad action, despite taking Pakistani complaints “seriously”, arguing that President Obama was convinced that he had the “right and imperative” to mount the raid. The State Department spokesman said that Washington maintained the “right to strike in Pakistan again if it had actionable intelligence on the presence of any high value target in the country”.³⁹ Clinton, the first official to visit Islamabad post Abbotabad, said that although no highest level official was involved, “We look to Pakistan, to the Government of Pakistan to take decisive steps in the days ahead.”⁴⁰

Afghanistan

President Hamid Karzai’s reaction reflected vindication. Calling the Western strategy misconceived, he said, “Year after year, day after day, we have said the fighting against terrorism is not in the villages of Afghanistan, not among the poor people of Afghanistan.... The fight against terrorism is in safe havens. It proves that Afghanistan was right.”⁴¹

China

In a strong defence of its “all-weather” strategic ally and neighbour, China described Pakistan as being “at the forefront of international counterterrorism efforts”. “The international community should understand and support Pakistan”, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu said. “We support Pakistan’s position, and understand and support Pakistan formulating and implementing a counterterrorism strategy based on its own national conditions.”⁴² Later, Prime Minister Gilani, during his China visit a few days after the Abbotabad operation, quoted the Chinese Premier as saying “We acknowledge that

Pakistan has made great sacrifices and important contributions in the global fight against terror.... No country has any right to intervene in Pakistan.” Media reports also talked of a Chinese delegation to Washington having asked the US to stop pressuring Pakistan. “I wish to stress here that no matter what changes might take place in the international landscape, China and Pakistan will remain forever good neighbours, good friends, good partners and good brothers”, Wen added.⁴³ However, according to a report in the *Friday Times*, China had made it clear that it would only be able to offer diplomatic support to Pakistan in case of a standoff between the US and Pakistan at the United Nations. “The maximum we would be able to offer Pakistan at the UN would be a veto in favour of Pakistan”, he said. But “if we faced persistent requests from President Barack Obama and other world leaders then we could also decide to abstain from such a Security Council meeting”.⁴⁴

Iran

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said a few days after the operation in a live interview on Iranian state television that Osama bin Laden was a prisoner in US custody for “sometime” before he was killed by the American military. “I have exact information that Bin Laden was held by the American military for sometime ... until the day they killed him he was a prisoner held by them. Please pay attention. This is important. He was held by them for some time. They made him sick and while he was sick they killed him”.⁴⁵ The Iranian human rights chief Mohammad Javad Larijani said that Osama deserved a fair trial and not a “unilateral execution” by American forces.⁴⁶

Saudi Arabia

In Saudi Arabia, the country of Osama’s birth, a statement released by the Saudi Press Agency said that his death was a “step that supports the international efforts against terrorism.” It added that the Saudi people in particular were targeted by “this terrorist organization”.⁴⁷

Iraq

The official reaction in Iraq was to condemn Osama. “Iraqis suffered a great deal at the hands of this man and his terrorist organization. Thousands of Iraqis were murdered and killed because of his ideology”, Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said. “We, like many people in the world, are delighted to see an end to his mentality and his devious ideology.” Ali Mussawi, media adviser

to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, said Iraq “welcomes the death of Osama bin Laden” and expressed the hope that it “will mark the beginning of the end of the sectarian way of thinking.”

Russia

The Russian reaction was rather mellow, coming on 11 May, as a passing reference at a government meeting to discuss the need to strengthen security at Russian embassies against terrorist and other threats. “The liquidation of terrorists, even as high-profile as the recently killed bin Laden, is directly related to the level of security in our country”, President Dmitry Medvedev said, adding that the Russian security services had killed a number of al-Qaeda emissaries in the insurgency-hit southern regions of the country.⁴⁸ Russia’s soft reaction may have been because Russia, facing insurgency in the South, did not want to appear overenthusiastic in order not to harm itself in its southern provinces.⁴⁹ One day before his talks with President Zardari in Moscow, President Medvedev said that Osama’s killing would help Russia fight the Islamist insurgency in the south.⁵⁰

India

Home Minister P. Chidambaram said in a statement that India took note of the event “with grave concern”. “This fact underlines our concern that terrorists belonging to different organizations find sanctuary in Pakistan.” The perpetrators of the terror attack in Mumbai in November 2008, including the controllers and handlers of the terrorists, continued to be sheltered in Pakistan. He wanted the persons whose names had been handed over to the Interior Minister of Pakistan to be arrested. He also wanted India to be provided with “voice samples of certain persons who are suspected to be among the controllers and handlers of terrorists.”⁵¹

Much was made of the Army Chief Gen. V K Singh’s statement on 4 May, in answer to a question, to the effect that India’s armed forces were “competent” to carry out an operation similar to the one conducted by the US forces.⁵²

The Minister for External Affairs, S.M. Krishna, said that Osama bin Laden was “the father-figure of international terrorism” and “links can easily be established” between him and the terrorist attack on Mumbai in November 2008. Despite such links “we will have to deal with them [the Pakistanis] as our neighbours..... Disengaging Pakistan, because of bin Laden’s episode in

Pakistan, certainly would not be a very wise move.”⁵³ Minister of State for External Affairs, E. Ahmed, said that India’s position on Pakistan would not change with the Abbotabad incident and asked Islamabad “to take note of the international outcry and bring to book the perpetrators of heinous crimes, including the Mumbai attacks”.⁵⁴

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who was in Kabul days after the incident, said that a thorough investigation was needed to look “into the presence of Osama bin Laden for such a long time in Abbotabad”. He noted that Osama’s death had created a “new situation”. All the countries of the region — India, Pakistan and Afghanistan — would recognize this as a “unique moment” in the history of this region and work united to end the scourge of terrorism. Asked whether India would adopt the type of operation carried out by the US in order to get the terrorists wanted by it, he said: “These are sensitive issues and we don’t discuss strategies on terror in press conferences.” He added, “We are not the US”, implying that India did not favour such an operation.⁵⁵

Meanwhile India issued a list of fifty men it wanted extradited to stand trial on terror charges – which included Pakistan Army officers like Major Iqbal, charged with allegedly giving directions to those who carried out the Mumbai attacks, Major Sameer Ali and others like LeT chief Hafiz Saeed Masood Azhar, Ilyas Kashmiri and Rehman Pasha, allegedly the trainer of the terror group Indian Mujahideen through the LeT’s Karachi Project.⁵⁶ India had handed the list to Pakistan earlier in 2011 but only made it public in May 2011. However, India had to withdraw the list after the government was embarrassed to learn that at least two of the persons in the list were in India, one of them being in prison. The list was prepared by the Home Ministry in consultation with the investigating agencies. Wazhul Qamar Khan, who was wanted for his alleged role in the bombing of trains in Mumbai in 2003, was found on the outskirts of Mumbai, where he is out on bail. Home Secretary G.K. Pillai acknowledged the gaffe.⁵⁷

Impact

Only the immediate impact is being considered: it is too early to conceptualize the long-term consequences. According to the *Sunday Telegraph* (London), “Pakistan’s intelligence services are refusing to share details of suspects or plots with their American counterparts in protest at the US operation . . . , raising the potential threat of attacks on Western cities.” “[B]uffeted and embarrassed” by being kept in the dark for months about Osama, ISI agents have “begun to withhold crucial operational details about militants” on Pakistan’s territory.⁵⁸

The strategic dialogue between Pakistan and the United States is also said to have been postponed indefinitely. The dialogue, which covers a wide range of issues, such as Pakistan's energy needs and health and education, was initiated by the Obama administration to assure Pakistan that the cooperation would endure US withdrawal from Afghanistan, unlike the 1980s, and that their bilateral relations went beyond security matters.⁵⁹ The last round of the dialogue was held in October 2010 in Washington. The next round was supposed to have taken place in March 2011 but was put off because of the Ramon Davis affair. The two sides had agreed to resume the process in May. Raymond Davis was freed in a deal ostensibly with the heirs of the victims.

In early July the US announced \$800 million cut in military assistance to Pakistan, almost a third of its annual \$2.7 billion security assistance (in which \$300 million was for coalition support funds and \$500 million for military equipment and trainers).⁶⁰ This was probably because after the Abbotabad raid, the Pakistan Army had asked the US military trainers to leave the country.⁶¹ General Pasha subsequently visited the US, after which he (and General Kayani) sounded hopeful of the resumption of the suspended military aid and improvement of ties.⁶² Relations have, however, worsened, after the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested (now under house arrest) a 62-year-old US citizen, Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai, director of the Washington-based NGO Kashmiri American Council (KAC). He was accused by the Department of Justice of not informing the US government that he was being paid by the "Pakistan government while lobbying for the Kashmir cause and donating funds to Congressmen."⁶³ Pakistan rejected the allegation as "an attempt to defame the just cause of the Kashmiri people".⁶⁴ Media reports also talked of the ISI shifting India's most wanted terrorist, Dawood Ibrahim, from Pakistan to Azerbaijan or Tajikistan, basically "to keep him from the post-Laden killing troubles".⁶⁵

Meanwhile, there is no let-up in terror attacks. On 22 May the headquarters of Pakistan's naval air force in Karachi was attacked by militants, killing thirteen persons, injuring sixteen others and blowing up at least two military aircraft.⁶⁶ A report released by the Pakistan Institute of Peace in July said that the number of attacks on security forces across Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) registered a dramatic increase during the week ending on 10 July:

attacks on security forces across the province's settled and tribal areas started in the end of the second week of June in which 41 deaths occurred. As many as 120 people were injured in these incidents ... the attacks intensified again after a gap of two weeks, resulting in 48 deaths and 150 injuries.⁶⁷

NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen, when asked if NATO was concerned about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons considering that it took Pakistani forces seventeen hours to reclaim control of the naval airbase from the attackers and following the death of Osama bin Laden, said, "I feel confident that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is safe and well protected. But of course it is a matter of concern and we follow the situation closely."⁶⁸

Assessment

Confusion about Pakistan's exact role in the operation remains, the clarification by the ISI chief at the joint session of Parliament notwithstanding. The credibility of both the military and intelligence suffered a serious blow, as also of the civilian government. Preponderance of the former in Pakistan's political scenario has of course led to a greater part of all discussions being focused on it. The CIA chief was clear that Pakistan could not be told about the ultimate plan for fear of it being leaked. Others in the US acknowledged Pakistan's help for cooperating to lead to the ultimate US operation.

Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan and South Asia, Council on Foreign Relations, laid out the following worst-case scenarios for Pakistan in case the United States withdrew support:

[In the] first scenario, the nuclear country would become a rogue state that was overtly hostile to the United States, supportive of terrorism, and possibly joined under a "Chinese security umbrella".... The second scenario would see the slow disintegration of Pakistan's major government institutions, which would ultimately produce a lawless state akin to Somalia. [If this scenario occurred], it would be almost impossible to put the pieces back together again. Most security experts believe that the collapse of the Pakistani state could allow al-Qaida to gain control of a nuclear weapon.⁶⁹

This, of course, is largely a Western perception. Pakistan Army for its own strategic interests is hardly likely to let the jihadis get hold of its "ultimate weapon", and hence guards them zealously. The Western fears, as of now, seem exaggerated, if not unfounded.

The Western media have reported that General Ashfaq Kayani is "fighting to survive" in office.⁷⁰ Former Army Chief Jehangir Karamat has denied this: "this talk of him fighting for his job, his survival, I don't see any signs of that."⁷¹ Saying that there was "lot of anger" in the army and the anti-US feeling had gone up because there is "a whole lot of anger over the way it happened and the humiliation suffered, and it is inevitably reflected in the

army”.⁷² The Pakistan society’s anger at the army was explained by Hasan Askari Rizvi, when as a sign of “dented military prestige”, Pakistan’s Supreme Court ordered the withdrawal of a two-star general whose men were caught on video killing an unarmed youth. Rizvi said the apex court took the unusual action “in light of the hostile environment in the society toward the military”.⁷³

Where the legislature is concerned, a twelve-point unanimous resolution affirmed “full confidence in the defence forces of Pakistan in safeguarding Pakistan’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and in overcoming any challenge to security.” A realistic assessment would be that there is no “new turn or chapter in civil-military relations”. The joint parliamentary sitting was actually a part of military’s “grand plan of damage control”. The “timing, venue and most importantly the extent of information sharing that they did was of their own choosing”.⁷⁴

As regards inquiry commissions, an editorial in the *Express Tribune* says:

Commissions have not had a good innings in Pakistan. Some recent commissions have suffered from premeditation on the basis of media reports. Some commissions have been shelved with a big “secret” written on the file, like the famous Justice Hamoodur Rehman Commission report on East Pakistan and the Justice Shafiqur Rehman Commission report on the death of General Ziaul Haq.... Past commissions reports were often shielded from public view in order to help the army save face. This time they should be made public for the good of the army.⁷⁵

Ayaz Amir notes:

We are amenable to American pressure not so much because of our economic vulnerability, although that too is a problem, but because of our strategic double games: fighting some militants while nurturing and supporting others because of their presumed usefulness against India, or as future insurance policy for Afghanistan.... The foremost condition for the reclamation of sovereignty is an end to these games, *a final farewell to the use of militancy as a tool of foreign policy*.⁷⁶

As for India, the Prime Minister’s assertion that India is not the US may mean that this is not policy. However, the stakes for India are high. India has been a victim of cross-border terrorism for a far longer time – since 1989. The perpetrators of the Mumbai attack in November 2008 are roaming free and many are hiding in Pakistan. If the current US plans to withdraw from Afghanistan are accelerated in the wake of the Abbotabad operation, India has much to be worried about – from jihadis in Pakistan and Taliban (good, bad or ugly notwithstanding) in Afghanistan.

Endnotes

- ¹ Agencies, “ISI Officer Breaks the Ice on OBL saga”, *The News*, 4 May 2011, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=15118>
- ² Ahmad, Gulmina Bilal. “Truth or Dare?”, *Daily Times*, 6 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\05\06\story_6-5-2011_pg3_3
- ³ Gul, Imtiaz. “Operation Geronimo: Quid Pro Quo?”, *Friday Times*, 6–12 May 2011, Vol. XXIII, No. 12, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/06052011/page5.shtml>
- ⁴ Freedman, Thomas. “U.S.-Pakistani Relations Beyond Bin Laden”, *STRATFOR*, 10 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110509-us-pakistani-relations-beyond-bin-laden>
- ⁵ Gul, “Operation Geronimo ...”, n. 3.
- ⁶ Ansari, Maryam Khan. “5 Reasons Abbottabad Was a Great Hideout”, *Special to CNN*, 9 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/05/09/5-reasons-abbottabad-was-a-great-hideout/>
- ⁷ Ibid. She also states that Osama may have had personal reasons too. For instance, “Why endure the extreme weather of the rugged Afghani border areas when you could live in the ‘San Francisco’ of Pakistan”.
- ⁸ Niaz, Anjum. “Memo from USA”, *The News*, 7 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=45637&Cat=9>
- ⁹ Shah, Sabir. *The News*, 10 May 2011, “The 35 Top Conspiracy Theories Surrounding Osama’s Death”, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=5893&Cat=13&dt=5/10/2011>
- ¹⁰ Shah, Haider. *Daily Times*, 11 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\05\11\story_11-5-2011_pg3_2
- ¹¹ Hussain, Zahid. *The Times*, 31 October 2009, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6896956.ece>
- ¹² Yusufzai, Mushtaq. “Obama gets Osama”, *The News*, 3 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=5712&Cat=13&dt=5/9/2011>; “Even in Death”, *Express Tribune*, 3 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/160523/bin-laden-even-in-death/>
- ¹³ AFP. “No Evidence Pakistan Leaders Knew Where OBL Was: US”, *The News*, 27 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=16160>
- ¹⁴ Baldor, Lolita, Pauline Jelinek and Donna Cassata. “Robert Gates On Pakistan: ‘Somebody Knew’ Osama Bin Laden Was Hiding There”, 18 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/18/gates-pakistan-osama-bin->

- laden-hiding_n_863821.html; ITGD Bureau. "Somebody in Pakistan knew about Osama bin Laden's hideout: US", *India Today*, 19 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story/somebody-in-pakistan-knew-about-bin-ladens-presence-robert-gates/1/138639.html>
- ¹⁵ ITGD Bureau, *ibid.*
- ¹⁶ "Even in Death", *Express Tribune*, 3 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/160523/bin-laden-even-in-death/>
- ¹⁷ Reuters. "Pressure on Pakistan after bin Laden death-lawmaker", *Dawn*, 2 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/02/pressure-on-pakistan-after-bin-laden-death-lawmaker.html>
- ¹⁸ AFP. "US feared Pakistan might 'alert' Bin Laden about raid: CIA", *Dawn*, 4 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/04/us-feared-pakistan-might-alert-bin-laden-about-raid-cia.html>
- ¹⁹ Niaz, "Memo from USA", *The News*, n. 9.
- ²⁰ "More Abbottabad-like Raids Not to be Tolerated: COAS", *The News*, 6 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=15139>
- ²¹ "DG ISI admits Intelligence Failure", *The News*, 13 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=15493>
- ²² Klasra, Rauf. "In-camera Session: ISI Chief Shot Back at 'Favour-seeking' Nisar", *Express Tribune*, 15 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/169003/in-camera-session-isi-chief-shot-back-at-favour-seeking-nisar>
- ²³ *Ibid.*
- ²⁴ Editorial, "Daring decisions", *The News*, 15 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=47171&Cat=8>
- ²⁵ Zardari, Asif Ali. "Pakistan Did its Part", *Washington Post*, 3 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/pakistan-did-its-part/2011/05/02/AFHxmybF_story.html
- ²⁶ "Whole World Shares Osama Blame: Gilani", *Daily Times*, 5 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\05\05\story_5-5-2011_pg1_1; "Pakistan Has Not Been Alienated after Abbottabad Operation: PM", *Dawn*, 11 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/11/pakistan-has-not-been-alienated-after-abbottabad-operation-pm.html>
- ²⁷ Full Text Ibnlive.com, 9 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://ibnlive.in.com/news/full-text-gilanis-speech-in-pakistan-parliament/151768-53.html>
- ²⁸ AFP. "Give Explanation or Resign: Nisar", *Dawn*, 7 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/07/give-explanation-or-resign-nisar.html>
- ²⁹ "Zardari, Gilani Urged to Resign after US Operation", *Daily Times*, 8 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\05\08>

story_8-5-2011_pg1_2

- ³⁰ “Imran Asks PM, President to Resign over Abt incident”, *The News*, 8 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=15288>
- ³¹ “Nawaz Calls for Reviewing Relations with US”, *Daily Times*, 11 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\05\11\story_11-5-2011_pg1_1
- ³² Seeking a judicial commission for probe, he said at a press conference, “It is (a) matter of serious concern that our security institutions knew nothing when the helicopter gunships and commandos remained in our territory and airspace for so long”. Haider, Kamran. “More Pressure on Pakistani Military over Bin Laden” Reuters, Canada, 11 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE7410D320110511?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true>
- ³³ Awan, Asim. “More Questions than Answers: Pakistan’s Predicament”, *Friday Times*, 13–19 May 2011, Vol. XXIII, No. 13, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/13052011/page6b.shtml>
- ³⁴ Mehdi, Nisar. “MQM for Referendum on Post-Osama Situation”, *The Nation*, 12 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/12-May-2011/MQM-for-referendum-on-postOsama-situation>
- ³⁵ Murshed, S. Iftikhar. “The Fracturing of Al-Qaeda”, *The News*, 12 June 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=52176&Cat=9>
- ³⁶ Ahmed, Tanveer. “JUI_F JUI-F Lawmakers offer Fateha for Osama in NA”, *Daily Times*, 11 May 2008, [Online: web] URL: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C05%5C11%5Cstory_11-5-2011_pg1_6
- ³⁷ “Not a word on May 9 from the Committee Chairman, Senator Raza Rabbani, on an inquiry commission when he addressed the media after the committee’s meeting.” Zehra, Naseem. “The Abbottabad Inquiry: Nawaz Sharif’s Valid Demand”, *Daily Times*, 12 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\05\12\story_12-5-2011_pg1_8
- ³⁸ This was disclosed by Information Minister Firdous Ashiq Awan who said that consultation with the Chief Justice was not required for setting up the probe commission. She was justifying the case of Saleem Shahzad case where also the Chief Justice was not consulted and Supreme Court Judge Mian Saqib Nisar refused to lead investigations shortly after his nomination. Khan, Zia. “Saleem Shahzad Commission: Govt commissions another controversy” *Express Tribune*, 22 June 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/190676/saleem-shahzad-commission-govt-commissions-another-controversy/>
- ³⁹ Editorial, “US Response”, *Daily Times*, 11 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\05\11\story_11-5-2011_pg3_1

- ⁴⁰ Allbritton, Chris and Arshad Mohammed. "Clinton calls on Pakistan to do more Against Militants", *Reuters*, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/27/us-pakistan-usa-idUSTRE74P1G620110527>
- ⁴¹ Boone, Jon. "Osama Bin Laden Dead: US strategy misconceived, says Hamid Karzai", *The Guardian*, 2 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/02/osama-bin-laden-afghanistan-fears>
- ⁴² Krishnan, Ananth. "China for Global Support to Pakistan" *The Hindu*, 5 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article1993324.ece>
- ⁴³ Shahid, Tanveer Qaiser. "China endorses Pakistan's Response to US Raid: PM", *Express Tribune*, 19 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/171099/gilani-hails-all-weather-friend-china>
- ⁴⁴ Awan, Asim. "More Questions than Answers :Pakistan's Predicament", n. 34.
- ⁴⁵ AFP. "Bin Laden was a US prisoner before being killed: Ahmedinejad", *Express Tribune*, 16 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/169717/bin-laden-was-a-us-prisoner-before-being-killed-ahmedinejad/>
- ⁴⁶ AFP. "Bin Laden Deserved a Fair trial not Execution: Iran Official", *Dawn*, 13 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/12/bin-laden-deserved-a-fair-trial-not-execution-iran-official.html>
- ⁴⁷ Aneja, Atul. "Hero for Some Hate Figure for Many", *The Hindu*, 16 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2024015.ece>
- ⁴⁸ Radyuhin, Vladimir. "Russia's Tempered Response to Abbottabad", *The Hindu*, 13 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.hindu.com/2011/05/13/stories/2011051355571300.h>
- ⁴⁹ Ibid.
- ⁵⁰ Haider, Kamran. "More Pressure on Pakistani Military over Bin Laden", *Reuters Canada*, 11 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE7410D320110511?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true>
- ⁵¹ "Osama's Killing Proof that 26/11 Terrorists in Pak: Chidambaram", *Indian Express*, 2 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/osamas-killing-proof-that-26-11-terrorists/784450/>
- ⁵² "I would like to say only this that if such a chance comes, then all the three arms (of the military) are competent to do this", said General Singh in reply to the question. PTI, "Indian forces competent to carry out Abbottabad-like mission", 4 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://news.oneindia.in/2011/05/04/indianforces-competent-to-carry-out-abbottabad-like-oparm-aid0126.html>
- ⁵³ Suryanarayana, P.S. "Disengaging Pakistan Will Not be Wise: S.M. Krishna", *The Hindu*, 7 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article1998787.ece>

-
- ⁵⁴ PTI. “India’s Position on Pak not Changed after Abbottabad: Ahmed”, *The Hindu*, 6 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article1996550.ece>
- ⁵⁵ PTI. “We Are Not the U.S.: Manmohan”, *The Hindu*, 12 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2011599.ece>
- ⁵⁶ Phadnis, Aditi. “India Strikes While the Iron is Hot – Issues ‘Fugitives’ List”, *Express Tribune*, 12 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/167049/india-strikes-while-the-iron-is-hot—issues-fugitives-list/>
- ⁵⁷ AFP. “India Admits Blunder in ‘Most-Wanted’ List”, *Dawn*, 18 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/18/india-admits-blunder-in-most-wanted-list.html>
- ⁵⁸ Crilly, Rob. “Osama bin Laden Dead: Angry Pakistan Drops Intelligence Sharing with West”, *The Telegraph*, UK, 14 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/8513920/Osama-bin-Laden-dead-angry-Pakistan-drops-intelligence-sharing-with-West.html>
- ⁵⁹ Yousaf, Kamran. “Pak, US strategic dialogue postponed ‘indefinitely’ ”, *Express Tribune*, 1 July 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/200233/pak-us-strategic-dialogue-postponed-indefinitely/>
- ⁶⁰ AFP. “Pakistan Defiant as US halts \$800 Million military Aid”, *Express Tribune* 12 July 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/207874/pakistan-defiant-as-us-halts-800-million-military-aid/>
- ⁶¹ Ghauri, Irfan and Kamran Yousaf. “After Osama: Breaking Silence, Army Asks US to Reduce Troops”, *Express Tribune*, 6 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/162469/military-admits-shortcomings-on-bin-laden-intel/>
- ⁶² Imtiaz, Huma. “ISI Chief Lands in Washington”, *Express Tribune*, 13 July 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/208630/pakistan-intelligence-chief-heads-to-us-for-talks/>; Imtiaz, Huma. “ISI Chief’s US Visit Went Very Well”, *Express Tribune*, 15 July 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/210286/isi-chiefs-us-visit-went-very-well/>
- ⁶³ Imtiaz, Huma. “Kashmiri lobbyist Arrested for Withholding Information”, *Express Tribune*, 13 July 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/213319/two-kashmiri-leaders-arrested-in-us-on-illegal-lobbying-for-pakistan/>. Apart from a \$100,000 bond signed by his wife as co-guarantor, under conditions set by the judge, Fai was to be placed under house arrest with an electronic monitoring device, and not allowed to leave the Washington area; Fai’s wife has also been asked to surrender her passport to US authorities; Fai’s passport was already with them. Imtiaz, Huma. “Ghulam Nabi Fai admits to receiving money from ISI”, *Express Tribune*, 27 July 2010, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/218322/ghulam-nabi-fai-admits-to-receiving-money-from-isi/>
- ⁶⁴ “We appreciate the contributions made by the Kashmiri-American Council (KAC)

and Dr Ghulam Nabi Fai for the cause of Jammu and Kashmir”, said a Pakistan Foreign Ministry statement. Yusuf, Kamran. “Pakistan Accuses US of ‘Slander Campaign’ ”, *Express Tribune*, 22 July 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/214916/pakistan-accuses-us-of-slander-campaign/>. Also see Imtiaz. “Ghulam Nabi Fai Admits to Receiving Money from ISI”, *ibid*.

- ⁶⁵ Sharma, Rajnish. “Post-Abbottabad raid, ISI has Dawood out of Pakistan”, *India Today*, 5 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story/isi-has-moved-dawood-out-of-pakistan-report/1/137219.html>
- ⁶⁶ “Assault on PNS Mehran in Karachi”, *Dawn*, 23 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://forum.dawn.com/2011/05/23/assault-on-pns-mehran-in-karachi/>; another media report said, “five, out of seven rockets, hit the aircraft in the beginning of the attack while bullets were also fired on a bulletproof vehicle carrying foreigners. More than 1,000 bullets were fired during the exchange of fire from both sides ... (sources said that) two terrorists were gunned down during exchange of fire, while two others blew themselves up with suicide jackets when their guns had no bullets. It has also been learnt that some eight security personnel suffered bullet wounds when terrorists attacked them while six of them succumbed to their injuries during treatment.” Raza, Atif. “Initial Probe into PNS Mehran base Attack completed”, *Daily Times*, 30 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C05%5C30%5Cstory_30-5-2011_pg7_22
- ⁶⁷ Nangiana, Umer. “Resurgence in terrorist attacks after a two-week lull”, *Express Tribune*, 24 July 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/216259/resurgence-in-terrorist-attacks-after-a-two-week-lull/>
- ⁶⁸ Agencies. “NATO ‘Concerned’ about Pakistan’s Nuclear Security”, *Express Tribune*, 25 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/174925/pakistan-nuclear-security-of-concern-nato/>
- ⁶⁹ Editorial: “Let’s accept we can’t trust Pakistan”, *Orange County Register*, 12 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.ocregister.com/opinion/pakistan-300323-nuclear-state.html>
- ⁷⁰ “Kayani ‘fighting to survive’: WP”, *Daily Times*, 17 June 2011, [Online: web] URL: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C06%5C17%5Cstory_17-6-2011_pg1_1
- ⁷¹ “General Kayani Seeks to Repair Dented Army Pride”, *Express Tribune*, 20 June 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/192512/general-kayani-seeks-to-repair-dented-army-pride/>
- ⁷² *Ibid*.
- ⁷³ *Ibid*.
- ⁷⁴ Ahmad, Gulmina Bilal. “Turning the Tables”, *Daily Times*, 20 May 2011, [Online: web] URL: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\05\20\story_20-5-2011_pg3_4

- ⁷⁵ Editorial: “Commissions and Conclusions”, *Express Tribune*, 22 June 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/193435/commissions-and-conclusions/>
- ⁷⁶ Amir, Ayaz. “The Woes of an Ostrich Republic”, *The News*, 3 June 2011, [Online: web] URL: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID =50602& Cat=9&dt=6/3/2011>, Emphasis added.